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Power and Justice
The Role of Law in International Politics. Edited by Michael Byers. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. vii, 354. Price: $80.00 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Jake Sullivan.
The intellectual disciplines of international relations and international
law have long occupied distinct niches in scholarly examinations of the
international system. International law theorists have focused primarily on the
nature and scope of legal regimes, with particular emphasis on the hierarchy
of legal norms. Thinkers in international relations have traditionally centered
their analysis on the international distribution of power, and have privileged a
distinctly political sphere. More recently, writers have initiated a dialogue
between the two methodologies and fields of inquiry in an attempt to create a
useful synthetic framework. The Role of Law in International Politics, edited
by Michael Byers, represents a recent and comprehensive effort to that end.
The book is a collection of fifteen essays written by international relations
scholars, international legal theorists, and practitioners in both fields. These
essays grew out of papers presented at a conference of the British Branch of
the International Law Association in the autumn of 1998 and revised in light
of conference debates and discussions.
While each of the articles presents a self-contained analysis of various
issues at the intersection of international law and politics, the editor has
attempted to blend them together to address a few major thematic questions.
First, what is the character of international law, particularly with reference to a
globalized, post-Cold-War international system? Second, in what ways and to
what extent do international legal frameworks affect international politics, and
vice versa? Third, what are the most effective mechanisms for expanding and
modifying the international legal "system," and which actors should control
the process of norm generation and implementation? Related to each of the
questions is a broader inquiry into the impact of globalization: How have the
effects associated with this evolving process transformed the international
legal order? The organization of the essays does not allow for a seamless
narrative analysis of these questions, but Andrew Hurrell's conclusion ties
these themes together and weaves a relatively coherent fabric from the diverse
set of articles.
Arthur Watts lays the groundwork for these lines of inquiry in the
book's first essay, "The Importance of International Law." His piece reveals
two of the basic ideological commonalities of the contributors: 1) a belief in
the concept of an "international society," where community norms and
common affiliation help to shape the character of state interaction; and 2) a
sense that the rule of law plays some role in international politics, and a
consequent commitment to building common platforms to facilitate dialogue
between the two disciplines. This perspective rejects largely power-based
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accounts of law's role in international politics; however, the editor does not
include opposing voices, nor does he outline in substantial detail the operating
logic of the "Realist" school-a still-powerful force in international relations
theory. In his essay "How Do Norms Matter?," Friedrich Kratochwil decries
the "anaemic conception of politics as 'power politics,"' and posits that the
divide between politics and law has "increasingly impoverished inquiries in
both fields" (p. 35). Kratochwil goes on to discuss constructivist approaches
to international law, arguing that political and social order in the international
sphere are derived not only from the self-interested actions of rational actors,
but also from an evolving set of constitutive norms. Philip Allott's article,
"The Concept of International Law," follows on the heels of Kratochwil's
analysis, offering a perspective on what elements comprise international law
to better understand how that law influences international relations. He
contends that international law represents a human construct designed to
promote systematically a set of objective moral goals. The social function of
law, according to Allott, is ultimately to identify and promote the international
"public interest." In contrast, Martti Koskenniemi defends the approach of
legal formalism and asserts the superiority of individual states as guardians of
the international legal order. Unlike Allott, Koskenniemi believes that the
world's legal framework requires a set of strict, bright-line rules from which
no derogation is permitted in order to survive the challenge posed by the
"hegemony" of Western liberalism. Ultimately, however, despite differences
in perspective and approach among these authors, all agree on the need to
promote greater accountability of international actors through the legal
process.
Stephen Toope's article, "Emerging Patterns of Governance and
International Law," analyzes policy-oriented approaches to the questions of
compliance and implementation. Although he agrees with his colleagues that
politics and law do not occupy entirely separate spheres, he observes that
"[1]aw and power, and law and politics are not opposites, but neither are they
coextensive" (p. 102). Vaughan Lowe's essay, "The Politics of Law-Making:
Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?," generally heeds
Toope's admonition regarding the "relative autonomy of [international] law"
(p. 107) in its examination of the process by which new international legal
norms are likely to emerge over the next few decades. Lowe starts with the
premise that most of the fundamental rules, principles, and institutions of
public, state-referential international law are currently in place. However, he
goes on to observe that "the norms and the processes of international law are
being adopted outside the classical inter-State domain" (p. 224). This
sensitivity to the effects of globalization on the nature and scope of interaction
between international law and politics permeates the analysis offered in the
remaining pieces, which focus on the impact of law on specific spheres of
political activity.
In their respective essays, Eyal Benvenisti and Anne-Marie Slaughter
stress the disaggregation of the state and the increasing interpenetration of
domestic and international legal processes. Edward Kwakwa and Brigitte
Stem each approach the question of globalization and the international
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economy from a substantially different perspective, stressing the importance
of the state and of state-based regulation, and asserting that only a rule-based
regulatory system run by states can sustain an orderly and efficient global
economy. By contrast, Christine Chinkin and Makau Wa Mutua make social
movements and non-governmental organizations the centerpieces of their
respective analyses of international law's influence on human rights regimes.
Both authors express great reservations about the role of NGOs and
"transnational civil society" in effectuating positive change. Marc Perrin de
Brichambaut, Vera Gowlland-Debbas, and Georg Nolte, the authors of the
final three essays in the book, focus on the role and function of the U.N.
Security Council in the international legal system. The tension between the
normative aspirations of international law and the political realities faced by
international legal mechanisms like the Security Council is the central theme
of these essays. Each author brings a unique perspective to bear on what
Andrew Hurrell calls the "persistent recalcitrance of international politics" (p.
335) and what Antonio Cassese has termed "the end of a magnificent illusion"
(p. 335) that the United Nations would prove a panacea to the world's political
and social ills.
The book's chief strength, a diverse array of views on the intersection of
law and politics in the international sphere, also generates its chief weakness,
the occasionally haphazard organization of the articles and main themes. But
Hurrell's conclusion effectively ties together the disparate strands of analysis
presented in these wide-ranging and diverse essays. It coherently explores the
authors' conclusions regarding the relationship between international law and
politics, and the impact of globalization on the international legal order. As
Hurrell notes at the outset of his conclusion, "no definitive answers can be
given within the compass of one brief chapter" (p. 327). Ultimately, the main
objective of the book is to ask new questions, and to frame old questions in a
fashion more relevant to the current international system, rather than to divine
conclusive answers. To put together a single volume on a topic as vast and
conceptually difficult as the role of law in international politics is a daunting
task. But Michael Byers and his contributors have succeeded in clarifying and
framing the main points of debate and discussion, and in providing a useful set
of methodologies for future inquiry.
The Network Inside Out. By Annelise Riles. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2000. Pp. ix, 272. Price: $49.50 (Hardcover). Reviewed
by Solomon J. Greene.
In legal education and practice throughout the United States, law and
economics has emerged as the most popular hybridization of legal scholarship
with another academic discipline. Economic methods of analysis underlie
contemporary legal debates not only in their obvious applications to anti-trust,
taxation, and liability, but also in arenas as diverse as criminal justice,
procedure, and family law. Arguably, no other analytical framework in the
social sciences has been used as pervasively to guide legal reasoning, either in
the academy or in the practice of law.
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In The Network Inside Out, Annelise Riles, an associate professor at the
Northwestern School of Law, suggests that legal studies should make room
for another, and perhaps more persuasive, influence from the social sciences
to help explain how law is produced and how, in turn, it shapes human
behavior. Riles identifies anthropology as a compelling lens through which to
examine the law. In particular, Riles suggests that anthropology can expose
the mechanisms by which international law is created in the information age.
By employing the devices of ethnography and close cultural reading, her book
provides a fascinating glimpse into the minute and human processes that
economics, anthropology's more quantitative cousin, would likely overlook.
The Network Inside Out is the product of fifteen months of fieldwork
conducted by Riles in Fiji and the South Pacific region, as she worked with
women activists and bureaucrats in preparation for the United Nations Fourth
World Conference held in Beijing in 1995. The limiting and outmoded notion
of the anthropologist translating the exotic (or "Other") into the familiar
(Western knowledge) is quickly discarded by Riles, who insists that her
"subjects" have already done the analytical work for us. She adapts her
ethnography to a reality in which her informants (expert grant-writers, veteran
conference participants, and internet-savvy activists) have already analyzed
and documented their own work in meticulous detail. The common thread in
her analysis is neither the geographic location of her subjects, nor the
boundaries of a self-identified "community"; rather, it is the "set of
informational practices" shared by the persons and institutions she describes
(p. xvi). She labels these informational practices the "Network," defining
themes as "a set of institutions, knowledge practices, and artifacts thereof that
internally generate the effects of their own reality by reflecting on
themselves" (p. 3).
The hyper-reflective nature of the Network described by Riles raises
some interesting questions about the efficacy of human rights conferences and
institutions. In Chapter 2, "Sociality Seen Twice," Riles challenges the
characterization of the Network as a means of reaching out to ever-widening
circles of women's rights activists. She demonstrates that the rhetoric of the
Network, "one of the great innovations of the 1995 United Nations Women's
Conference and indeed of the global women's movement of the 1980s and
1990s" (pp. 47-48), was rendered meaningless by the insularity of Network
members and the intentional patrolling of information flows by participants.
Although the ostensible purpose of networking was information-sharing, the
"precise purpose of information exchange rarely was articulated" (p. 50).
"Networking" became an end in itself and was rarely attached to a greater
purpose or substantive goal. Riles explains how, in this scheme, "the subject
of Women, the Environment, or Population is almost a sideline of the real
goal of engineering a new web of personal relations" (p. 68). Relying heavily
on anecdotes, flow charts, and elaborate tables, Riles describes a world in
which Network participants gain authenticity by membership in increasingly
overlapping institutions, and the Network itself functions to preempt, rather
than to inspire, collective action.
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In a chapter comparing international human rights documents to hand-
woven Fijian mats, Riles demonstrates her skill in making the familiar exotic
through ethnographic devices. In this chapter, she highlights some of the
limitations of an international legal regime governed by strict obedience to an
"aesthetic of form" by deconstructing a pre-conference document. Riles
exposes how form supersedes content in international human rights
documentation: "Like mats, intergovernmental agreements ... partake in a
simple nonrepresentational patterning that is replicated again and again within
the document, from one document to the next, and in the mechanics of the
conference at which documents are negotiated" (p. 78). As in the mats, the
value of these documents is measured by their adherence to form, or by the
"success of the replication of a given pattern from one artifact to the next,"
rather than their innovative details or accurate representation of reality (p. 79).
Riles discusses how these documents, like the mats, become aestheticized
"items of collection," which are not read, but instead, endlessly sorted,
referenced, and displayed (p. 74). She also explores the contradictions
involved in the convention of "bracketing" language that lacks consensus
among signatories to intergovernmental agreements. These brackets
simultaneously create endless opportunities for modification and render the
document "unreadable" to many participants. Throughout the chapter, Riles
evokes such tensions by referencing parallels to Fijian mats, employing this
comparison more as a narrative device than an empirical relationship.
Riles concludes her book with a discussion of some of the implications
of the network form for international law and politics. Drawing from the
ethnographic analysis in previous chapters, she confronts the popular view of
networks within international law and international relations theory as "more
flexible, more progressive, more sophisticated forms of international action,
which hold out the hope of success where the state system has failed" (p. 172).
She argues that in the absence of a coercive enforcement body or universal
commitment to shared legal principles, "persuasion" has replaced
"compulsion" as the model of international governance (p. 180). Under this
system of persuasion, information, such as that generated and circulated by
international networks, takes on a deeper significance. While recognizing the
value of networks as "carriers of human rights ideas" and as an extra-
governmental adaptation to disaggregating state action, Riles challenges the
network form as "a good in itself' (p. 173). Without offering alternatives, she
criticizes the network form as it is currently manifested in transnational
human rights institutions for being caught in an "endless feedback loop" (p.
174) of causes and effect, means and ends.
From the outset of her book, Riles explains that she is concerned with
how she "might make the ending points of legal knowledge-the puzzles,
frustrations, facts, and commitments the theory and practice of law entail[s]-
beginning points for anthropological reflection and vice versa" (p. xiii).
Ultimately, however, she has a tendency to dwell on the tensions and issues
particular to ethnographic writing, and her reliance on fairly obscure concepts
and sub-debates within anthropology can be disorienting to readers not well-
versed in cultural theory. She fails to provide much in the way of explanation
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for the murkier concepts she employs, and the potent legal issues raised by her
research are not developed until her concluding chapter. Nonetheless, Riles
makes a significant contribution to international law by tracing the cultural
underpinnings of international human rights networks, and by forcing us to
rethink familiar practices. While The Network Inside Out is a testament to the
importance of ethnography and fieldwork in bringing into view "a series of
artifacts that are ubiquitous but untheorized elements of international legal
practice" (p. xiii), Riles leaves it up to her readers to conclude for themselves
what fruitful legal strategies could emerge from her creative ethnography.
Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and
Politics. By Martin Loughlin. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000. Pp. xi,
241. Price: $45.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by James K. Gooch.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there is a profound
confusion in western democracies concerning the relationship between law
and politics. Our means of governing ourselves-indeed, the very urge to self-
govern-has evolved along with our understanding of this dichotomy.
Unfortunately, in the midst of our ownfin de sijcle, we find ourselves without
a lucid understanding of the origins and implications of the deeply entrenched
marriage of law and politics: "Although it is an issue on which people often
hold strong opinions, their convictions generally manifest themselves either as
implicit assumptions or explicit assertions, only rarely as reasoned
explanations" (p. ix). The legal community in particular has difficulty
articulating its role in this union. In part, this may stem from our persistence in
clinging to the illusion that law and politics are still two separate spheres.
To understand the current milieu (as Dostoyevsky has told us in another
context), we must go back. This the British scholar Martin Loughlin does, to
the dawn of western political and legal philosophy in Greece. His goal is not
simply to give a history lesson, but to show that our habitual understanding of
the relationship between law and politics-that laws provide a check on the
potential for tyranny-is one-sided. We quickly see that law can also be a
mask for tyranny, as Plato's Adeimantus suggests (p. 14). Yet Loughlin wants
us to discard both of these simplistic characterizations for the more telling
insight that where "power and justice appear almost as flip sides of the same
coin," law and politics in fact work together (if not always in concert) in the
fundamental human activity of normative world-making (p. 17).
This premise lays the foundation for an exegesis of the central role our
laws and politics play-not just in creating our world, but as symbols in our
societies. In an observation familiar to the scholar of American
constitutionalism, Loughlin points out that the actions and symbols of the
courts must both describe our values and inspire our faith and confidence. The
"politico-legal order," the result of normative world-making, "constitutes an
array of abstract symbols-equality, democracy, sovereignty, the rule of
law-each of which are [sic] designed to evoke an attitude" (p. 26). These
words function as icons for a manipulable civic conscience. When these icons
begin to move according to the rules of the political game, this conscience
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may become disoriented. The modem reality of blended law and politics is
thus at the root of civic malaise.
To unpack the origins of that malaise, Loughlin discusses the
components of the dichotomy between "justice" and "the state." In his chapter
on "Justice," Loughlin discusses the iconography of justice, in particular the
image of the Roman goddess Justitia (of the sword and scales). Together with
the chapter on "The State," his discussion generates a mental image of twin
figures, Justice and Government, half dancing, half wrestling to best express
the will of the polity. The legal community and the government have
competing and complementary conceptions of their role in governance and
law. These chapters show how each has gradually taken on the hallmarks of
the other. The government makes law, but judges are forced to make political
decisions, such as which cases to hear and which mode of interpretation to
apply. By describing how the roles of judges and governments in the west
have become intermingled through the growth of the administrative state,
Loughlin lays the ground for a discussion of modem constitutionalism.
The trend of constitutionalism in the west began with the unwritten
constitution of England and continued with the written constitution of the
United States. The observations of Tocqueville on America offer a
counterpoint to Montesquieu's picture of English government. In modem
constitutionalism, Loughlin finds a crucial shift in western thought from
corporatism to the ascendancy of the rights of the individual: "[W]ithin this
new revolutionary discourse, rights are recognized as existing prior to the
power of the sovereign. Rights do not derive from the political constitution,
but are the antecedent to constitutional order and provide the foundation on
which all constitutions are constructed" (p. 198). According to Loughlin, this
change in the focus of politics and justice resulted in the transfer of
responsibility for the individual from the people, who once had to fight for
their rights, to the government, now obliged to protect those rights. The
infusion of "rights" across civic boundaries (people, government, judiciary)
produces a role-identity crisis in society. When the constitution incorporates
rights, responsibility for preserving those rights may be viewed as belonging
to the judiciary; this results in "the legalization of politics" and "the
politicization of law" (p. 209).
Loughlin seems ambivalent about the effects of this evolution. When the
ascendancy of the individual is built into the foundations of a society
motivated by material success, Loughlin feels cynicism is likely to result. The
politicization of law has, to his eyes, erased the image of a "dispassionate and
venerable law-giver" (p. 234). Perhaps the only weakness of this book is the
lack of a prescription. Having been made starkly aware of the problems
created by the conflation of law and politics, the reader hopes for an answer to
the problem.
Loughlin would likely see this urge for a palliative as typically
American. Yet perhaps the most interesting and valuable part of the book, for
an American reader, is its English perspective. Loughlin draws lessons from
the American experience without making them central to his thesis.
Substantively, there is little new offered in his analysis. But that is not
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Loughlin's aim. Rather, his intent is to draw our attention to the birth and
development of the crucial dichotomy between law and politics, and through
history to provide a backdrop for viewing their interrelationship.
Democracy and Constitutionalism
The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the
Critique of Ideology. By Susan Marks. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000. Pp. 164. Price: $49.99 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Evan
Criddle.
In the wake of revolutionary changes in the political landscape of
Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe over the last three
decades, some legal scholars have argued that international law has outgrown
its traditional ideological neutrality. No longer should international law simply
preserve peace through impartial Cold-War-style balancing. Instead, these
scholars argue that international law must lay the foundation for a more secure
and lasting peace by recognizing and fostering the emergence of a universal
"right to democratic governance." In The Riddle of Constitutions:
International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology, Susan Marks
uses a critique of ideology to deconstruct popular formulations of this
"'democratic norm' thesis" (p. 2). Marks's critique offers a penetrating
analysis of the ways in which acceptance of a "democratic norm" actually
stabilizes and perpetuates relations of domination, rather than promoting self-
rule and political equality, as its proponents maintain.
According to Marks, acceptance of the "democratic norm" in
international law would have tremendous consequences for national
governments. For example, a democratic norm in international law would
suggest that national governments derive legitimacy from internationally
specified criteria. Only governments founded upon democratic principles
would meet the standard set by these criteria. Marks admits, of course, that
this position is vulnerable to attack on a number of fronts. First of all, the
assessment that a democratic norm of governance is emerging is far from
clear, especially outside of the Western world. Hence, forcing pro-democratic
bias upon international law may represent a threat of neoimperialism. Second,
even if a principle of "democracy" merits transnational application, narrow
application of the "democratic norm thesis" might promote structural change
in ways that would limit rather than expand democratic participation in
decision-making processes.
Marks focuses her critique on the question of how this limitation on
participation would come about. According to Marks, movements toward
democracy often focus on "low-intensity democracy": reforming a limited set
of structures and procedures while leaving deeper power centers
fundamentally intact. Thus, restructuring of certain national political
institutions will not deliver meaningful democratic reform as long as
necessarily related objectives such as human rights, social justice, and civilian
control of the military remain untouched. The institution of free and fair
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elections will have little impact on common citizens while social and
economic inequalities consolidate political power in the hands of only a few.
Nominally democratic political structures will inevitably fail without the
tempering influence of a vibrant public sphere where public policy may be
molded, evaluated, and challenged.
Extending her analysis, Marks argues that the impact of "low-intensity
democracy" upon a single nation can only be understood within a
transnational context. As democracy spreads, it expands the boundaries of
global markets and provides participants in these markets with greater access
to resources as barriers to transnational capital flows dissolve. While newly
liberalized economies may benefit from an influx of foreign investment and
expanded markets for their own goods, they also fall under the economic and
political hegemony of dominant Western states. In this way, fostering "low-
intensity democracy" may entrench an uneven distribution of global power
and resources. In addition, new access to transnational markets inevitably
exacerbates uneven power-distributions within the new democracies
themselves. With this socio-economic polarization comes increased social
tension, which in turn provokes the political marginalization of subordinate
classes. Thus, "low intensity democracy" inevitably self-destructs as the
economic and social inequalities it fosters obliterate prospects for meaningful
self-rule and political equality.
Marks further deconstructs "low-intensity" approaches to the
"democratic norm thesis" by analyzing its uses as ideology. For the purposes
of her critique, Marks defines ideology as "ways in which meaning serves to
establish and sustain relations of domination" (p. 10). Like other ideologies,
"low-intensity democracy" employs a number of legitimization and
dissimulation strategies to establish its authority. For instance, supporters of
"low-intensity democracy" resort to rationalization, suggesting that since
"low-intensity" democratization is the only measurable, attainable goal, it
must likewise be the best. At the same time, the "democratic norm" masks
inequalities of decision-making power through devices such as unification, the
"imaginary resolution of social and political antagonisms" (p. 65), and
simplification, "presenting social life in reductive terms . . . [to hide] the
unevenness and complexity of social processes" (p. 65). Similarly, reification
of the term "democracy" and reliance on dichotomous reasoning (democratic
vs. non-democratic) reduce the democratic ideal to a set of finite structural
characteristics, while masking real political inequality among independent
citizens. Such dissimulation strategies draw attention away from the
fundamentally undemocratic realities at play in self-proclaimed democratic
systems. Marks believes that this ideological conceptualization of democracy
encourages policy-makers to approach democratization as a linear process in
which the attainment of civil and political rights necessarily precedes and
frustrates efforts to secure economic and social rights. Furthermore, this
ideological screen masks the extent to which globalization reduces the power
of national decision-makers over their citizenry by fostering dependence upon
extra-national forces.
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How might the "democratic norm" thesis be reformulated to overcome
these ideological roadblocks and achieve more meaningful results? Marks
believes that an important starting-place is the recognition that democracy is
not merely an "institutional arrangement," but rather "an ongoing process of
enhancing the possibilities for self-rule and the prospects for political equality,
against a background of changing historical circumstances" (p. 59). In this
conception, human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, and free elections are
simply first steps towards democracy, not reliable indicators that democracy
has been achieved. What is needed, Marks asserts, is not the recognition in
international law of a democratic entitlement, but rather a "principle of
democratic inclusion" (p. 109) that would "guide the elaboration, application,
and invocation of international law" (p. 111).
Marks concludes her critique by sketching out the possible impact of this
proposed principle of democratic inclusion. Democratic inclusion, she
suggests, would strive to transcend the arbitrary self-limitations of the
democratic norm thesis. In other words, it would encourage policymakers to
address the complex interrelationship between social and economic forces and
political decision-making power. It would take into account the political
implications of contemporary globalization by addressing the effect of
transnational political forces on national political agendas. Attention to the
political and economic hegemony of dominant groups in the international
arena would prompt broader forms of international regulation and
accountability. The principle of democratic inclusion would ground efforts
towards democratization of global politics.
Of course, Marks's deconstruction of the "norm of democratic
governance" begs the question of whether her own reconceptualization of
democracy might not also serve as ideology. Marks concedes that her
"principle of democratic inclusion" is no less susceptible to being used for
ideological purposes. She affirms, however, that the system of ideological
critique employed in her book provides a lens through which to discern and
thereby eliminate any ideology to which her own "principle of democratic
inclusion" might be subjected in the future. Even granting the obvious validity
of this observation, troubling questions persist about Marks's own work. If
both the "democratic norm theory" and the "principle of democratic
inclusion" may be made to serve ideology, why is one principle inherently
superior to another? To what ideological end is Marks's thesis likely to be
applied? Why would her ideology be preferable to ideology associated with
the "democratic norm" thesis?
Even more puzzling than Marks's refusal to engage such questions about
future ideological application of her own proposal, however, is her inability to
confront in a meaningful way the ideology that controls her own basic
assumptions about democracy itself Why, for example, is democracy
desirable at all? Why is it desirable on an international or transnational scale?
How does the movement for acceptance of democracy on an international
level transcend neoimperialist ideology, particularly Marks's own book?
Marks remains silent on these and many other troubling issues. Fortunately,
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The Riddle of all Constitutions provides skeptics with an excellent critical
paradigm for further interrogation of Marks's own unanswered questions.
Democratic Governance and International Law. Edited by Gregory H. Fox
and Brad R. Roth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Pp.viii, 585. Price: $100.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Mary Fan.
A conception of democracy as an entitlement emerged at the end of the
Cold War. This universalized right to democracy is no mere platitude: it has
become the banner for new excursions of power into the old understanding of
sovereignty, leaving a wake of conceptual haziness for scholars trying to make
legal and normative sense of the change.
Democratic Governance and International Law compiles writings from
seventeen authors, representing a breadth of the leading thought in this area
hollowed by the collision of politics and law. The twenty articles and excerpts
are aimed at answering the core question of "whether there can meaningfully
be said to be, in Thomas Franck's pioneering words, a 'democratic
entitlement' in international law" (p. 4), write editors Gregory Fox, Assistant
Professor of Law at Chapman University Law School, and Brad Roth,
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science at Wayne State
University.
This book represents a first step towards constructing a legitimate legal
framework for influencing other nations' regime types-a superpower luxury
much contested in recent decades for its lack of a clearly rooted, legitimizing
standard of authorization. The articles in the book also attempt to answer an
important underlying question: Should intervention under the banner of
democracy go farther and become bolder, or should it be tempered despite
recent apparent successes such as bloodless electoral revolutions?
The editors begin by recounting the historical context of this question.
The Cold-War-era diversity of states made the promotion of democracy as a
standard with any force impossible until democracy became ascendant by the
1990s, at the peak of a wave of democratization. The movement has
culminated in the norms of today, where international organizations explicitly
and actively promote democracy, shattered states are reconstructed along
democratic lines and intervention may even be considered an option when the
electoral mandate is adjudged usurped. The profound change in political
perception is evidenced by the 1999 passing of a resolution entitled
"Promotion of the Right to Democracy" by the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights by a vote of 51-0, with China and Cuba abstaining.
The book is divided into five parts that assess the foundations and
implications of the "right to democracy." The first part examines the systemic
foundations of the idea, beginning with discussions by two of the earliest
contributors to the "Democratic Entitlement School," Thomas Franck and
Gregory Fox. The third contributor in the section, James Crawford, examines
the potential inconsistencies of a right to democracy with the current body of
international law, and the direction that the development of international law
must take to accommodate the right.
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The second part of the book examines the effects of recent developments
in democratization on inter-state relations. Sean Murphy discusses the impact
of democratic considerations on criteria for recognition of both states and
governments, comparing past and contemporary practices. He argues that
recognition must turn on the current regime's effective control rather than
regime type.
Stephen Schnably discusses the experiences of the Organization of
American States as it navigated the tension between its stated commitment to
preventing military interruption of government and the principle of non-
intervention. Anne-Marie Slaughter concludes the section with a discussion of
the thickening linkages of regulatory agencies across borders. She explains
how this "transgovernmental order" is increasingly the arbitrator of
transboundary problems, offering solutions to the loss of regulatory power by
individual governments and the need for rapid decision-making presented by
economic globalization.
The third section of the book addresses the use of force in the name of
democracy. W. Michael Reisman opens the section by arguing that the
traditional view that would shield non-democratic states from intervention is
anachronistic and should fall to the emerging conception that governments
imposed in opposition to popular will have no legitimate shield to foreign
intervention, whether collective or unilateral. His elegant reconception of
legitimate sovereignty as posited upon a nation's responsiveness to its
citizens' popular will and needs raises practical implications that are both
compelling and troubling. For example, if the United States were to adopt this
progressive vision of sovereignty in its foreign affairs, should domestic
conceptions of state sovereignty and their expression in law also be modified?
Reisman's argument for intervention provokes dissent by Michael Byers
and Simon Chesterman, who uphold the traditional conception of sovereignty
as more protective of citizens' interests and highlight the dangers and
intrusiveness of unilateral intervention as evidenced, for example, by U.S.
intervention in Grenada and Panama.
David Wippman examines an alternative arrangement to legitimate
intervention whereby legal governments of a state consent in advance to
outside intervention in the event of a coup. Brad Roth argues provocatively
against the legality of such pacts, noting that they are often little more than "a
sleight of hand that allows adherents of the democratic entitlement to avoid
facing up to the implications of a liberal-democraticjihad," and do not reflect
the present will of the people (p. 341).
Concluding the section, John Owen discusses the democratic peace
thesis, arguing from empirical observations that "[lliberal peace is real" (p.
385), and that international organizations would benefit from promoting
peace-but not by force of arms, which would be a self-defeating exercise.
The fourth section addresses normative questions surrounding the
conflicting imperatives of democratization. The first three chapters consider
the argument that democratic values do not call for toleration of political
forces destructive of the democratic system. Steven Ratner concludes the
section with a discussion of reconciling the conflicting concerns of facilitating
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smooth transitions toward democracy and prosecuting the human rights
violations of outgoing regimes.
The fifth section presents critical approaches. The writers caution that
democracy in form does not necessarily indicate democracy in substance, and
that to enshrine notions of democratic entitlement based on criteria of form
rather than substance in the present euphoria or "liberal millenarianism" (p.
534) now prevailing would be a hollow exercise at best.
The book takes a strong step towards its goal of uncovering a legal core
of democracy from the tangled lines of political dialogue wrapped thick
around it. The danger is, of course, that when the political thicket is cleared,
there may be nothing beneath at all, or only a corroded hope that, once
separated from its wrappings of support, disintegrates.
War
Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law. By Karma Nabulsi.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. x, 293. Price: $72.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Eric Braverman.
No one disputes that ideological differences loom large in international
politics, particularly as we leave a century that saw both hot and cold
confrontations-wars of philosophic passion in which enemies excoriated
each other for impeding what each perceived to be knowable and inevitable
progress. Yet, in seeking to understand how nations have built the body of
international rules that now regulate such conflicts, scholars often focus not on
grand ideology but on the immediate, pragmatic concerns that guided the
lawmaking states at any given bargaining table.
Karma Nabulsi-former Palestinian negotiator and current research
fellow at Oxford-explicitly rejects this anti-ideological approach in her new
book, Traditions of War. She contends that it was "philosophical principles
rather than narrowly conceived and particularistic state interests" (p. 77) that
constrained the nations who met to write the laws of war at Brussels, the
Hague, and Geneva between 1874 and 1949. Specifically, Nabulsi argues that
irreconcilable normative traditions of war prevented the parties from drafting
laws that adequately distinguished combatants from noncombatants.
Nabulsi's work relies on five essential (though largely unspoken)
arguments: (1) that nations possessed three normative traditions of war
between 1874 and 1899; (2) that each of these traditions perpetuated
themselves as part of a feedback loop; that is, not only that the traditions
"informed concrete practices" at the conferences, but also that "practices on
the ground helped to shape the theories themselves" (p. 78); (3) that these
traditions actually guided the parties at Brussels, the Hague, and Geneva; (4)
that the parties could not resolve the distinction between combatants and
noncombatants because their traditions were irreconcilable in each specific
case; and (5) that other factors, such as utilitarian concerns, did not primarily
cause this failure.
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Nabulsi is particularly persuasive in characterizing the different
traditions, a task that encompasses most of the book. Studying patterns of
occupation and resistance in Europe, she concludes that there were three main
traditions, which she calls the martialist, the Grotian, and the republican.
Martialism, Nabulsi writes, is the philosophy of the "expanding nation"
(p. 82), the doctrine that "war is both the supreme instrument and the ultimate
realization of all human endeavour" (p. 81). Assuming that man is by nature
evil-"a Promethean being, delighting in his own strength and cruelty" (p.
89)-the martialist tradition affirmatively obligates the state to harness this
evil in a program of "conquest and foreign rule" (p. 81). Indeed, martialism
presupposes that "the only manner in which an individual's true liberty [can]
be expressed [is] through the burning crucible of the nation" (p. 102). Nabulsi
points to the nineteenth-century British imperial army as a chilling example of
how martialism represents the tradition of an occupying invader bent on
protecting its rule by pillage, hostage-taking, and reprisals.
By contrast, Nabulsi's republicanism is the defensive philosophy of an
occupied people. Unlike martialism, the republican tradition holds that man is
good, "naturally filled with both love and pity" (p. 189). To republicans, this
very "capacity for love" (p. 189) serves as the emotional underpinning for a
state whose principal goals are not only "dedication to the common good" but
also "political equality" and "liberty understood as independence" (p. 224).
Thus, the republican tradition embraces war only as the means to protect
popular sovereignty; for an occupied people, techniques of partisan warfare
and popular uprising stand as the heroic response to a martialist occupier.
Specifically, Nabulsi points to the Polish and Corsican insurrections of the late
1700s as evidence of this tradition. Given Nabulsi's former role as deputy to
the PLO chief in London, it is unsurprising that the republican tradition draws
her most passionate (if at times uneven) rhetoric.
Between martialism and republicanism, finally, we find what Nabulsi
calls the Grotian "middle way" (p. 128). Where the martialist and republican
traditions hold opposing, essentialist views of the good or evil in man, the
Grotian tradition is a non-essentialist doctrine of "ideological relativism" (p.
147). In a sense, this Grotian tradition is a non-ideological ideology, for it
seeks order and "peace at any price-be it collaboration or even slavery" (p.
240); the tradition is one of "precedent" rather than "principle" (p. 148). Since
the Grotian tradition exalts stability, and since Grotians presume that
authoritative power best preserves stability, the "central ambition" of the
Grotian tradition of war is to "limit the rights of belligerency to a particular
class of participant (the soldier), and to exclude all others from the right to
become actively involved in political violence in times of war" (p. 77). As the
tradition of Lieber and de Martens, the Grotian tradition underlies much of
today's humanitarian law. But while it is theoretically neutral as between
occupiers and the occupied, Nabulsi points out quite insightfully that in
practice the Grotians almost always favor occupying armies-because armies,




Although Nabulsi expertly defines and describes these three normative
traditions-and thus quite masterfully convinces the reader of the first of her
five arguments-she is far less successful in addressing any of the other four;
that is, in showing that these traditions had any actual application. Nabulsi
does provide substantial evidence for how practices on the ground shaped the
development of the traditions. For example, she illustrates eloquently the
impact of the Corsican insurrection on the republican writings of both
Rousseau and Paoli. But she does not show effectively how these writings
shaped international practice-neither in the specific case of the humanitarian
law conferences, nor even generally. Moreover, her placement of these
descriptions in the second half of the book is unfortunate, since it provides a
necessary backdrop to the arguments contained in the first part.
Nabulsi also presents very little primary source material from the
conventions themselves as proof of her argument that ideological traditions
actually mattered there. Without this evidence, it is difficult for the reader to
assess whether Nabulsi's eloquent articulation of the three traditions have any
empirical value. As a theoretical argument alone, Nabulsi's identification of
these traditions is not particularly rousing; surely it is a truism to state that
occupying powers and occupied peoples, may have irreconcilable values in
any negotiation about the legitimate scope of war.
Nabulsi's most effective passages-those that reveal the relative
exclusion of occupied peoples in an international system of states-are
secondary to her stated mission, which she defines and redefines frequently
throughout the book. But a more comprehensive examination of the place for
occupied peoples in a system of ideological relativism would be a welcome
contribution to this compelling, and under-studied, area of international law.
Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post Cold War World. By
Charles J. Moxley, Jr. Lanham, MD: Austin & Winfield, 2000. Pp. xxv,
781. Price: $65.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Kimberly A. Woody.
In July 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory
opinion addressing the legality of nuclear weapons. Though the Cold War has
ended, the continued presence of conflict and terrorism makes the question of
the legitimacy of nuclear weapons as pertinent as ever. In his contribution to
the nuclear weapons debate, Charles J. Moxley focuses on the perspective of
the U.S. government, ultimately arguing that "the United States [should]
recognize the unlawfulness of nuclear weapons and . . . strive to lead the
world into a non-nuclear weapons future" (p. 781).
Moxley, a litigator based in New York, and a former law school faculty
member, organizes his book into five parts. Part I summarizes both the
position of the United States regarding the legality of nuclear weapons and the
advisory opinion of the ICJ. Moxley "develop[s his] analysis . . . from the
United States' own mouth" (p. 15). Relying on U.S. military manuals and the
arguments made by the United States before the ICJ, Moxley outlines the
United States' view of the law on this subject; namely, that nuclear weapons
are not prohibited per se, and that the legality of the use of nuclear weapons
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must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Moxley goes on to provide a
lengthy discussion of the ICJ's advisory opinion. The ICJ found that most
uses of nuclear weapons would be illegal; however, the ICJ did not have
enough information to decide the legality of the use of nuclear weapons by a
state as a last resort means of self-defense. Moxley interprets the ICJ opinion
as containing a "grand and historic invitation: Show us the facts" (p. 250). He
responds to the invitation by providing the facts in the form of the risks of
nuclear weapons in Part IV, and by suggesting how those facts apply to the
law in Part V.
Part II contains principles of law that, according to Moxley, apply to the
issue of the legality of nuclear weapons. In this section, Moxley adds to the
nuclear weapons debate by arguing that these principles are "so broadly
recognized across the world's legal systems" that they are binding on these
systems, including the United States, as "general principles of law" (p. 253).
These principles include a per se rule for the illegality of nuclear weapons.
Moxley prepares the foundation for his disagreement with the United States
over the question of whether nuclear weapons are per se illegal by outlining
the elements necessary to trigger the rule.
Part III discusses two legal issues tangentially related to the topic of
nuclear weapons: the law regarding landmines and the principle of double
effect (which Moxley argues is inconsistent with other generally accepted
principles of law). Part IV includes a comprehensive analysis and discussion
of the practical effects of nuclear weapons, emphasizing the risks associated
with the use of such weapons. Relating this discussion to the Part III of the
book, Moxley asserts "that the ultimate conclusion as to lawfulness or
unlawfulness turns largely upon probabilities as to the effects of the use of
nuclear weapons" (p. 395).
Part V concludes the book by applying the facts from Part IV to the law
discussed in Part I. Because the United States defended its position before the
ICJ only with respect to a "limited use of a small number of low-yield nuclear
weapons in non-urban areas" (p. 653 n. 1), Moxley restricts his analysis to this
"more challenging question" (p. 654) rather than addressing the use of nuclear
weapons in general. Moxley argues that, contrary to the United States' view,
the effects of nuclear weapons cannot be controlled, the risks outweigh the
benefits, and conventional weapons are sufficient to meet military objectives.
Moxley's theories derive in part from his vision of the high risk of an initial
use of low-yield nuclear weapons leading to either full-scale nuclear war or
the use of chemical or biological weapons. Furthermore, because nearly every
possible use of nuclear weapons is unlawful based on "impermissible effects"
(p. 762), including radiation, nuclear weapons are per se illegal. Ultimately,
Moxley recognizes that even if the United States refused to agree that the "per
se rule" was absolute, adoption of such a rule would be "a powerful first step"
(p. 766) in post-Cold War nuclear policy-making.
Moxley's attention to detail ensures that the reader will find this book an
informative and comprehensive guide to the United States' and the ICJ's
positions on the legality of nuclear weapons. Such detail and volume of
information does, however, result in a fairly long book. Moxley assists the
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reader in sorting through the information by providing succinct headings and
sub-headings for each chapter. He also begins each section and chapter with a
summary that is concise and easy to understand. As an encyclopedic reference
on the topic of nuclear weapons law, Nuclear Weapons and International Law
in the Post Cold War World serves its purpose well.
Post-Conflict Societies
Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Jeng Sary.
Edited by Howard J. De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J. Robinson.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. Pp. xi, 558.
Price: $79.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by David Marcus.
In August of 1979, as the Khmer Rouge was retreating to the jungles
along the Cambodian-Thai border, the Vietnamese-backed People's Republic
of Kampuchea (PRK) held a five-day proceeding trying in absentia Pol Pot,
the prime minister of the Khmer Rouge's Democratic Kampuchea (DK), and
Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs. The trial, more akin to
a stage-managed spectacle than a search for justice, raised serious questions of
due process as it found Pol Pot and Ieng Sary guilty of genocide and
condemned them to death. Accordingly, the trial has been all but forgotten by
scholars and practitioners as they search for post-Nuremberg precedent to
flesh out the law of genocide.
In spite of these flaws, the trial of Pol Pot and leng Sary warrants
revisitation. Current efforts to establish a tribunal for surviving Khmer Rouge
elites raise similar questions as those encountered during the 1979 venture.
Moreover, the 1979 trial was the first to use the Genocide Convention as
substantive law, an important fact in light of recent issues arising in the
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. With this in
mind, Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and leng
Sary is a particularly timely scholarly contribution. An extensive compilation
of documents used by prosecutors as well as witness statements and
arguments made by the prosecution and the defense, the volume offers a
comprehensive introduction to the tragic history of Cambodia under the
Khmer Rouge, to the 1979 proceeding, and to the legal issues implicated by
the Khmer Rouge's crimes.
Three introductory essays begin the volume-Helen Jarvis's account of
the process of discovering and assembling many of the documents, John
Quigley's discussion of the trial's place in international law, and Howard J.
De Nike's anthropological analysis of the legitimacy of the tribunal. The
documents themselves come next, organized into three parts. Part I includes
those relating to the establishment of the tribunal, such as the tribunal's
charter as well as statements made by public figures at the outset of the
proceedings. Of particular interest is the speech delivered by Keo Chanda,
Minister of Information, Press, and Culture, in July of 1979. Keo Chanda
denounces methodically "the crime of genocide committed by the Pol Pot-
Ieng Sary" clique (p. 49). Several pages later it is discovered that Keo Chanda
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is to be the president of the tribunal, immediately bringing into question the
impartiality of the proceedings. Part II is composed of documents produced
during the trial's investigation into the alleged offenses, including witness
statements, government-led field investigations, and reports written by
"experts" on various aspects of life under the Khmer Rouge. The volume's
value lies primarily in this part's comprehensiveness. Attention is paid to
everything from the Khmer Rouge's destruction of ethnic minorities to its
warfare on religion to its decimation of public health, giving a detailed
illustration of a society turned upside down and suggesting a prosecutor
determined to bring all of the Khmer Rouge's crimes to the fore. Part ImI
concludes the volume with the indictment, closing statements of the
prosecution and the defense-including several arguments made by foreign
counsel invited by the PRK to lend the trials an air of international
legitimacy-and the judgment articulating Pol Pot's and Ieng Sary's guilt and
condemning them to death.
Three questions, explicitly referred to in the introductory essays, are
implicitly raised by many of the documents. First, it is unclear if the crime of
genocide, as defined in international law, applies to the mass butchery
perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge. Article II of the Genocide Convention
defines genocide as "... . acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . ." DK officials
intentionally annihilated the Cham, an Islamic minority living in
predominantly Buddhist Cambodia, as well as other ethnic minorities, but it is
questionable whether or not the greater number of the victims, destroyed
because they were intellectuals, members of the former regime's bureaucracy,
or other suspected "counterrevolutionaries," count in the genocidal tally.
Quigley, an American lawyer who was asked by the PRK in 1979 to address
this question, argues convincingly that "the Genocide Convention does not
exclude targeting members of one's own national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group" (p. 6). More importantly, because the Convention considers "that
genocide is present when there is an intent to destroy only a designated group
either in whole or in part," "since [intellectuals and urban residents, among the
focii of the Khmer Rouge's murderous designs] were 'part' of the Khmer
people, the targeting of them might constitute genocide" (p. 6). The
documents in Part II, and the arguments advanced by the prosecution's closing
address and the tribunal's judgment, emphasize the intentional murders of
religious leaders, intellectuals, and other groups as if to lay to rest doubts
about the reach of the Genocide Convention in this setting.
More importantly, Quigley does not address whether or not the tribunal
established Pol Pot's and Ieng Sary's individual intent to commit genocide,
and none of the documents attest to their individual responsibility. Perhaps in
1979 the question of whether or not Pol Pot and Ieng Sary meant to perpetrate
mass destruction was almost insultingly academic; however, in making a case
under contemporary standards of individual responsibility, it might prove
difficult to establish conclusively that Pol Pot and Ieng Sary specifically
intended the catastrophe they wrought. It is interesting and disconcerting that
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nowhere in the proceedings, with the exception of a conclusory discussion in
the indictment, is this question raised.
Second, it is unclear what the PRK authorities wished the trial to
accomplish. The Decree Law No. 1 establishing the tribunal pays lip service
to the "people's wish that . . . all reactionary ringleaders, who stubbornly
oppose the people and owe a heavy blood debt to them, should be sternly
punished . . ." (p. 45). However, it is clear that equally important to PRK
authorities was the validation of the Vietnamese occupation of the country, the
establishment of the PRK (Hanoi's puppet regime) as the sole legitimate
government of Cambodia, and the shaming of the Chinese for their support of
the Khmer Rouge. Many of the witness statements, for example, end
formulaically with a paean to the new government. Similarly, the Chinese are
denounced throughout the documents as "Chinese hegemonists and
expansionists" (p. 334) and are labeled as the puppeteers pulling the strings of
Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Many of the witnesses couch their statements in
identical terms, bringing into doubt the independence of their origin. It
appears that the PRK, a tool of Soviet-backed Vietnam, used the trial as a
setting for scoring political points in the Soviet-Chinese pas de deux.
Finally, the documents and the introductory essays beg the question of
what significance the 1979 trial has and whether or not it should be included
in the small body of international criminal law precedent. De Nike, an
anthropologist, argues in his troubling essay that "show trial" is a "well-worn
shibboleth" that does not do the 1979 proceeding justice (p. 20). He claims
that the trial did a good job at publicizing to the world the crimes of the
Khmer Rouge, and he excuses procedural irregularities as necessary sacrifices
given the unstable political situation. Quigley's essay complements De
Nike's, arguing that the 1979 trial, the first proceeding to use the Genocide
Convention as substantive law, should be revisited as viable legal precedent.
However, neither essay tackles the more pertinent faults of the tribunal as
revealed by the documents themselves-namely that the trial, even though it
included no real defense of Ieng Sary and Pol Pot, did not establish their
individual culpability. Notably, the defense was granted only one afternoon to
make its case, and none of the arguments made by defense counsel address the
question of the personal guilt of the defendants. In spite of the introductory
essays' desires to the contrary, the documents included in this volume do little
to belie the common assumption that the 1979 trial was little more than a
political show.
These unanswered questions aside, Genocide in Cambodia should prove
a valuable and provocative tool for academics and possibly practitioners.
Quigley's essay is particularly good, and the documents are at times
stunningly personal and poignant. As legal precedent, the 1979 trial leaves
much to be desired, but as an historical episode, the trial is of primary
importance, and it is done a great service by this volume.
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Justice in Africa: Rwanda's Genocide, Its Courts, and the UN Criminal
Tribunal. By Paul J. Magnarella. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. Pp. xii, 154.
Price: $59.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Jenia A. Iontcheva.
Only six years ago, the Rwandan genocide shocked the world with its
brutality and intensity. In the space of 100 days, more than 800,000 Tutsis and
moderate Hutus were killed by machete-wielding fellow citizens. The
international community, for the most part, stood by in embarrassment, unable
to muster the political will to intervene. Instead, it acted only once the conflict
was contained, by establishing an international criminal tribunal to judge the
individuals responsible for the egregious human rights violations committed
in Rwanda.
Paul Magnarella's book offers a crisp review of the origins, the
escalation, the resolution, and the adjudication of the Rwandan genocide. In
light of recent efforts to create international tribunals for Sierra Leone, East
Timor and Cambodia, Magnarella's work is a timely response to a continuing
endeavor to confront humanity's violent side. Justice in Africa is accordingly
aimed at a wide audience. As the author himself declares, it is directed to
readers who are not necessarily lawyers or anthropologists, but who want to
comprehend why and how the Rwandan tragedy occurred and what has been
done in the aftermath to remedy its gross injustices.
Magnarella begins his work with an inquiry into the causes of the
Rwandan genocide, utilizing a "human materialist" paradigm. Human
materialism attempts to break the agency/structure dichotomy in social
science by blending "infrastructural causality with humanistic teleology," (p.
1) and by employing a flexible hierarchy of causes to explain social events.
Working within this complex theoretical framework, the author reviews the
history of Rwandan society from pre-colonial times until 1995. He focuses on
key figures and events, while remaining deeply attentive to material factors
shaping the course of Rwandan history, such as the geography and the
biological environment in the Great Lakes region. The conclusion Magnarella
draws from this historical overview is that Rwanda's critical food-people-land
imbalance was an essential condition for the genocide, but that it was
ultimately the near-sighted policies and divisive strategies of the Rwandan
elites, supported by a traditional culture of obedience, that precipitated the
vicious conflict. The author briefly notes and then brushes aside the
contention that decisions by the U.N. Secretariat and the Security Council had
a significant impact on the unfolding of genocide. Nor are the historical
policies of the colonial powers, Germany and Belgium, or the contemporary
actions of the international community seen as key contributory factors to the
escalation of the interethnic conflict.
In Chapter 2, the author focuses his attention on the role of the
international community in the Rwandan debacle. The review is largely
expositive, marking the chronology, the nature and the scope of foreign
economic, political, and military intervention in Rwanda. Magnarella
mentions some critiques of this intervention, such as the 1999 United Nations
Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the Rwandan genocide.
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The inquiry placed the responsibility for failing to prevent or end the genocide
on the U.N. Secretariat, U.N. Security Council, Belgium and to a lesser extent
the United States. The author himself steers away from these controversies,
preferring instead to preserve his self-designated role of detached observer.
In the third chapter, Magnarella focuses on the post-conflict response of
the international community to the Rwandan genocide, describing the
creation, structure and operations of the United Nations International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The author describes some of the jurisprudential
innovations of the Tribunal's statute, such as the application to an internal
armed conflict of the law of crimes against humanity, Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The discussion of the ICTR's work is not purely legal or theoretical,
however. In Chapters 3 and 4, Magnarella considers many of the practical
aspects of the Tribunal's operations, such as the material limitations on the
Tribunal's functions, the scandals related to alleged mismanagement of the
institution and the continuing tension between ensuring both efficiency and
fairness of the judicial process. In light of recent strikes by ICTR detainees to
protest the Tribunal's allegedly unfair procedures and in view of renewed
critiques of the Tribunal's efficiency coming from within the United Nations,
this chapter is particularly timely and relevant.
As the author proceeds to discuss the post-conflict work of Rwanda's
own judiciary in the next chapter, the dilemmas of the ICTR soon appear
trifling. It faces a slew of cases and overcrowded detention facilities. In this
environment, the severely understaffed and under-funded Rwandan courts
have little time for legal niceties, or for fine calculations of the tradeoffs
between efficiency and fairness. As Magnarella observes, expediency reigns
supreme.
In Chapters 6 and 7, the author breaks the narrative sequence and shifts
the focus back to the ICTR, by examining Kambanda and Akayesu, two of the
Tribunal's most prominent cases. Magnarella locates the importance of the
trial of Rwandan ex-premier Jean Kambanda primarily in the defendant's
extensive admissions of guilt. In the author's view, these confessions, having
become part of the public record, should forever dispel doubts about the
occurrence of a premeditated genocide in Rwanda and should provide
historians with extensive information about the conflict. The trial of former
Taba mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu, in turn, is deemed significant in that it was
the first genocide trial before an international criminal tribunal. It gave rise to
numerous jurisprudential developments, such as the functional interpretation
of what constitutes an "ethnic group" protected by the Genocide Convention,
the deduction of genocidal intent from a series of factual presumptions, and
the conceptualization of sexual violence as genocide.
The conclusion of Justice in Africa is as free of evaluative remarks as
the main body of the work, positing primarily, and almost in passing, that the
ICTR is an institution that has contributed greatly both to the Rwandan
reconciliation and to the development of international humanitarian law. Here,
as in the rest of the book, the author simply describes events and controversies
instead of analyzing them or digesting them for the reader. While this may
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appeal to readers looking for a quick guide through the mire of Rwanda's
unfortunate recent history, it is also the book's chief imperfection. The
author's reluctance to engage in commentary leaves unanswered some of the
most intriguing questions underlying his narrative, much to the dissatisfaction
of the polemically disposed reader.
The Pinochet Case: A Legal and Constitutional Analysis. Edited by Diana
Woodhouse. Portland, OR.: Hart Publishing, 2000. Pp. xx, 297. Price:
$54.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Marcos Barbosa Pinto.
Few events in international law have attracted as much attention as the
attempted extradition of Chile's former dictator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
from the United Kingdom to Spain. The affair raised and illuminated some
fundamental issues of international law and their relation to the British legal
system. The Pinochet Case: A Legal and Constitutional Analysis is an attempt
to analyze some of these fundamental issues.
The book is a collection of essays resulting from a workshop organized
by the Centre for Legal Research and Policy Studies, at Oxford-Brookes
University, in March of 1999. The book is divided into two parts, each
composed of three essays. The first part addresses the consequences of
Pinochet for British and European law, while the second part addresses issues
of international law. The essays are accompanied by the three decisions of the
House of Lords on Pinochet.
The essays are preceded by an introduction to the facts of the case
provided by the book's editor, Diana Woodhouse. She reports on the affair
from the arrest of Senator Pinochet in October of 1998, which resulted from a
request for extradition issued by a Spanish court. Woodhouse describes the
first hearing of the case by the House of Lords in November of 1998, and the
reasons why this hearing was subsequently set aside under suspicions of bias.
Woodhouse then explains the second hearing of the case in March of 1999, in
which the House of Lords found that Senator Pinochet could be legally
extradited to Spain for crimes committed after 1988. Unfortunately, although
the book was published after Senator Pinochet's release in March of 2000, all
of the essays were prepared pre-release and thus the work fails to address the
case's final chapter in the annals of English law.
An essay by David Robertson follows the introductory chapter and uses
Pinochet as a background to assess the aptness of the House of Lords as a
political and constitutional court. In Robertson's view, Pinochet shows that
the House of Lords is not prepared to exercise its assigned adjudicatory
function properly. Robertson believes that the court is still attached to a
mechanical conception of constitutional adjudication and pays little attention
to its role in the political process. Robertson criticizes the Pinochet House of
Lords because it failed to "give leadership to a nation, to make its legal system
more than a technical solution mechanism" (p. 24). He suggests that the court
should change its political culture and working methods in order to perform its
tasks in the political arena, but Robertson fails to explain thoroughly and
defend his contestable assertion.
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In the second essay of the book, Evadne Grant provides a thoughtful,
clear, and well-organized analysis of the decision of the House of Lords to set
aside its first judgment under suspicions of bias. She concludes that, although
correct, the court's decision may have a narrow application to other cases. In
addition, she suggests that the court failed to provide clear and accessible
guidance for judges in the future. She finishes by regretting the fact that the
court's opinions on the issue of bias did not refer to the law of the European
Union.
Paul Catley and Lisa Claydon also advance this last point in the third
essay, which approaches the question of bias in light of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Catley and Claydon begin by comparing the
House of Lords' decision with the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights. They suggest that although the result would have been the
same, the Lords' reasoning might have been different had their decision been
based on the precedents of the Strasbourg Court. The essay's authors stumble
here, as their explanation of Strasbourg Court precedent is unstructured and
confusing. Catley and Claydon go on to conclude their essay by urging British
courts to take account of European Convention on the question of bias, since
this treaty will become law in the United Kingdom in the near future.
Chapter 5, by Judith Hendrik, approaches Pinochet from a moral
perspective. Convinced that a strong belief in justice is pervasive in the case,
Hendrik examines the relation of justice to prominent traditional theories of
punishment. She concludes that retributivism is the theory which best explains
Pinochet and international laws relating to human rights crimes. After
examining the concept of responsibility as applied to the case, Hendrik
concludes that the moral arguments that support the conviction of Pinochet are
sound and that the assertion of his innocence is untenable.
The subsequent essay, by Jonathan Black-Branch, deals with the issue of
sovereign immunity. Black-Branch assesses the legitimacy of Pinochet's
claim to immunity by examining the main sources of international law-
treaties, custom, principles, judicial decisions, and the work of jurists. The
conclusion he draws from this analysis is that the House of Lords erred in
interpreting the immunity principle in Pinochet. In Black-Branch's opinion,
the court should have respected this established principle of international law
by refusing to accept jurisdiction over any acts committed by Pinochet. It
should not be left to individual states, he believes, to become the police of the
world. However, Black-Branch reaches his conclusion after a catalogue of
arguments in favor of the immunity principle, which fails to address any of the
strong arguments postulated by the Law Lords in their well-reasoned
opinions.
In the final essay, Ben Chigara examines the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction in the administration of international justice. He argues that
Senator Pinochet violated norms ofjus cogens and, therefore, could have been
legally extradited to Spain. He nonetheless believes that, from a political
standpoint, international crimes should always be tried by international
tribunals. Chigara asserts that states that decide to grant amnesty to
perpetrators of international crimes should notify the United Nations in order
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to ensure the acceptance of a national decision by the world community at
large. Chigara's essay is necessarily cursory as it attempts to explicate and
justify the issues raised by jus cogens laws, international crimes, universal
jurisdiction, and political commitments to Latin America in the short space of
thirteen pages.
The Pinochet Case: A Legal and Constitutional Analysis succeeds in
providing an acceptable introduction to the facts and legal issues of Pinochet.
Its first chapter is a clear and precise description of the case. Additionally, the
House of Lords' opinions at the end of the book are quite useful. But the book
is no more than an introduction with most of the essays providing a superficial
gloss to complex, conflicting and vexatious issues of international law. The
book operates on the level of a primer which may inform the student of
international law and provoke interest in the many areas within the purview of
the text, but which may not satisfy the expectations of the more savvy scholar.
Transitional Justice. By Ruti G. Teitel. New York: Oxford University Press,
2000. Pp. vii, 292. Price: $35.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Laura
Provinzino.
Inspired by the wave of liberalization at the end of the twentieth century,
Transitional Justice explores two principal questions: (1) "What legal
approaches do societies in transition adopt in responding to their legacies of
repression?" and (2) "What is the significance of these legal responses for
these societies' liberalizing prospects?" (p. 213). The answers posed by both
realist and idealist accounts of justice in transition are unsatisfying both for
their failure to explain the significance of law's rule in periods of radical
political change and the relation between normative responses to past injustice
and a state's prospects for liberal transformation. Teitel eschews both of these
standard approaches and employs a constructivist approach that breaks from
traditional scholarship, which defines transitions solely in terms of democratic
procedures, and instead focuses on the nature and the rule of legal phenomena
in political transformation. The central thesis of Transitional Justice "is that
the conception of justice in periods of political change is extraordinary and
constructivist: It is alternately constituted by, and constitutive of, the
transition" (p. 6). Teitel stops short of giving a proscriptive answer to
transitional justice, appropriately leaving room for historical and cultural
contingencies uniquely present in each transition.
In developing the author's thesis, Transitional Justice starts by rejecting
the idea that the move toward a more liberal democratic political system
implies a universal or ideal norm. Each transition is different and constrained
by unique historical and political factors so there is no convergence upon an
idealized liberal democratic outcome. Recognizing the brute reality that
transitional societies are unable wholly to transcend historical and political
limitations, an alternative way of thinking about the relationship between law
and political transformation results. Teitel draws deftly upon historical
transitions, including the liberal revolutions of the Enlightenment and the
twentieth century's postwar liberalizations, but places primary emphasis on
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the recent transitions from Communist rule in Eastern and Central Europe and
the former Soviet Union, as well as the transitions from military rule in Latin
America and Africa. The rule of law in these periods of political change is
further explored by looking at its various forms: punishment, historical
inquiry, reparation, purges, and constitution making. While Teitel argues
against the prevailing view of transitional justice which favors punishment,
she acknowledges that what rule-of-law values take precedence is a function
of the particular historical and political legacies of the society. The challenge
and rule of transitional jurisprudence remains "to somehow bridge
conventional legality and the normative shift entailed by liberalizing
transformation" (p. 215). Understanding what constitutes the normative shift
to a liberal society predicated on the rule of law becomes a central concern in
the work.
Transitional Justice looks at the rule of law in transition. During times
of radical transition, the rule of law can be understood as a normative value
scheme that is both historically and politically contingent and elaborated in
response to past political repression. Therefore, the transitional rule of law
embodies distinctive values particular to each transitional period--"there is no
single correct response to a state's repressive past" (p. 219).
Successor trials are popularly thought to be foundational in
transformations to liberal order. They are thought to delineate clearly the shift
from illegitimate to legitimate rule; however, in transitional contexts, the
exercise of a state's power to punish raises serious concerns. As Teitel notes,
trials in contemporary transitional periods are rare because of political
constraints and the systematic and pervasive nature of the prior wrongdoing.
As conventional legal norms of individual responsibility are inapplicable, new
legal norms develop. Partial sanctions emerge to play a role in the
construction of a liberal society aimed less at penalizing perpetrators than at
advancing the political transformation's normative shift.
Transitional Justice analyzes in depth the course of justice during the
period after repressive rule when transitional societies commonly create
historical accountings. Historical inquiry helps to bridge the past to the present
and to define the relationship between truth and politics. Historical justice
both redefines a past and reconstructs a state's political identity, helping to
ensure that the past is never repeated. Reparatory justice, administrative
justice, and transitional constitutionalism are also cogently developed and
explored by Teitel.
The work's conclusion synthesizes the various themes developed and
analyzes how new democracies respond to past legacies of injustice. What
emerges is a sober optimism, a pragmatic balancing of ideal justice with
political realism. Teitel's analysis helps to form a new paradigm of
"transitional jurisprudence." This paradigm defines periods of political
passage in which transitional jurisprudence arises within a bounded period.
Contrary, perhaps, to conventional jurisprudence, justice is partial, contextual,
and situated between at least two legal and political orders in transitional
justice. Legal norms vary and justice is often a compromise. Whether trials,
constitutions, or historical inquiries are used, normative change results in a
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new political order. Law's role is transitional, not foundational. In transitions,
law is caught between the past and the future, between looking backward and
looking forward, and between the individual and the collective.
Transitional Justice explains that the study of law's role in political
change goes beyond political criteria. Teitel recognizes that the emphasis of
transitional jurisprudence on the rule of law is firmly entrenched in, and
interrelated with, politics. Transitional law's distinctive contribution to
transitional justice is that it is both constrained by, and transcendent of,
politics. In transitions, a balance of ideal theories of law and the political
circumstances of transition result in an imperfect and partial justice. This new
model of transitional jurisprudence, and its resulting vocabulary, is salient in
contemporary transitions, and informs our understanding of the function and
nature of law more generally. Against the backdrop of recent transitions in
East Europe and Latin America, Teitel provides another vision of the rule of
law in transitional contexts that results in non-ideal, "compromised" justice.
Transitional Justice presents a compelling balance between the
historical and the contemporary and the theory and the reality of transitional
justice, drawing upon sources as far-ranging as the Bible, H.L.A. Hart, Kant,
and Kuhn. Teitel's writing is lucid and approachable, with useful chapter
demarcations and focused summaries. Transitional Justice also provides
extensive notes and a useful index for the researcher. This timely and
impressive book is an excellent resource for policymakers and scholars of
democracy as well as for those who are curious about how the new paradigm
of transitional jurisprudence can further knowledge in more conventional
areas of law.
Authority and Representation
People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. By Ted Robert
Gurr, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000. Pp.
xviii, 399. Price: $29.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by Kimberlee
Weatherall
From the 1990s through the present, world media attention has been
trained on conflicts over questions of ethnicity or communal identity. Too
often, however, broader perspectives are lost in the horrific details of a
particular crisis. Ted Robert Gurr attempts to redress this imbalance in his
recent work People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century.
Drawing on data from the Minorities at Risk project based at the University of
Maryland-a broad-ranging comparative study into ethnopolitical groups and
conflicts worldwide-the author makes statistical assertions regarding global
trends in ethnic conflict and related phenomena, and as to potential outcomes
to particular situations of ethnic or communal unrest.
The Minorities at Risk project involves the compilation of a detailed
data set relating to the situations of ethnopolitical groups numbering over
100,000, or at least one percent of a country's population, which fulfill one or
both of the following criteria: (a) the group collectively suffers or benefits
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from systematic differential treatment or persistent disadvantage, and (b) the
group's identity is the basis for political mobilization in promotion of its self-
defined interests. Presently 275 groups are included in the project, with others
slated for inclusion.
People versus States is a successor to Gurr's 1993 book Minorities at
Risk, which presented results and analyses for the period 1945-89. Gurr's new
book presents analysis of this same data set, supplemented by new data from
the period 1990-98. Gurr and his co-authors assume three tasks that utilize the
unique strength of their data set, which is its long-term extensive coverage of
groups in all regions of the world, making large-scale comparisons possible.
The first task is to identify regional and global trends in political action
by ethnic and other communal groups, which, according to the author,
increased in number and intensity from the end of World War II to a peak in
1990-91, followed by a gradual decline since 1994. Gurr's findings confirm
the common sense view that rebellion of ethnic groups most often follows a
long period of conventional political activity and organized protest, thus
drawing attention to many lost opportunities for peaceful conflict management
prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
The second task that Gurr undertakes is to sketch a theory of the
conditions associated with political assertion by ethnic and communal identity
groups. Gurr identifies four factors giving rise to circumstances in which
groups that identify themselves using ethnic or national criteria mobilize to
defend or promote their interests in the political arena. These four factors are:
(1) the salience of communal identity-how much difference such identity
makes to people's lives, for example in terms of comparative disadvantage;
(2) the group's incentives to act-for example, the experience of repression or
discrimination; (3) the group's capacities to act-such as territorial
concentration, or pre-existing organization; and (4) the group's opportunities
for ethnopolitical action- both domestic and international. Gurr then
analyzes the presence of discrimination and state repression against all of the
groups studied, as well as its apparent consequences for (or at least correlation
with) the rise or fall of ethnopolitical conflict. Unsurprisingly, Gurr's analysis
suggests that severe state repression is more likely to prolong and intensify a
conflict than end it. More surprising is the assertion that the evidence indicates
a relative, though not universal, decline in discrimination suffered by such
groups worldwide.
In this second part of his argument, Gurr summarizes evidence of efforts
to resolve conflicts, and argues that there has been a shift in public policies
regarding ethnic groups in the mid-1990s away from policies of assimilation
and control and towards policies of pluralism and accommodation.
Interestingly, the author finds evidence of this shift not only in democracies
but also in some autocracies. This part of the book makes highly pertinent
reading for scholars interested in the effects of democratic transitions, as well
as policymakers who set the agenda for democratization. Not all of Gurr's
findings regarding the relationship between democratization and
ethnopolitical conflict are congruent with conventional wisdom: for example,
he finds that while transitions to democracy in the developing world have
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often been associated with a decline in rebellion, the opposite was true in
postcommunist countries.
Gurr also considers a familiar issue of importance in situations such as
Kosovo or Israel: the resolution of conflicts that involve national peoples
seeking independent statehood or autonomy. The author's findings-if true-
are encouraging. He finds that more of these "ethnonational" wars have been
settled or contained through international engagement and negotiations since
the early 1990s than in any decade of the Cold War. Additionally, Gurr's
analysis suggests that a majority of ethnonational wars since 1960 have led to
increased autonomy-a finding of interest to both ethnonational groups and
challenged governments.
The third part of Gurr's argument seeks to apply his findings to identify
groups where there is potential for future conflict. Using the factors already
identified, the author seeks to respond to oft-repeated calls for better "early
warning" and preventative measures to forestall serious ethnic conflict, by
providing a framework for systematic risk assessment that identifies the
background conditions where such a risk exists, and the groups affected.
Using a five-factor analysis, Gurr's model claims to predict presence or
absence of protest with seventy-two percent accuracy, and his six-factor
analysis is claimed to predict rebellion with eighty-eight percent accuracy.
When the model is applied, the picture is sobering: at the beginning of 1999,
ninety-four groups were at medium or high risk of ethnopolitical conflict,
including forty-one groups already in open rebellion. Yet the final note of
Gurr's study is not unremittingly negative: rather, Gurr contends that despite
obvious challenges like Kosovo there is a set of principles and practices for
managing heterogeneity in society, as well as common international policies
on how best to respond to ethnopolitical crises and conflicts.
The strength of People versus States lies in the broad comparative
perspective it brings to an area usually dominated by case studies. While the
book is a political science analysis, not a legal one, it is useful to international
lawyers engaged in this area, because it provides a broader perspective, and
both challenges to, and confirmations of, conventional wisdom. However,
Gurr's study is not without limitations. Given the often volatile nature of the
circumstances of ethnopolitical groups, the time lag between the data which is
current to the end of 1998 and the publication date detracts somewhat from
predictions regarding particular groups, though perhaps not from the book's
overall framework and model. It is also possible to quibble with aspects of
Gurr's identification and grading of variables. In addition, the exigencies of
producing a summary analysis from a large data set entail some loss of
transparency in the process of reaching conclusions. Helpfully, for the more
technically skilled reader, the analytical and statistical methods used by the
author are described in an appendix. Ultimately, Gurr's study provides a
useful addition to Minorities at Risk, and a valuable and timely broader
perspective to an area of study that dominates world attention and the
discipline of international law.
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Thoughts from a Bridge: A Retrospective of Writings on New Europe and
American Federalism. By Eric Stein. Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, 2000. Pp. xiii, 497. Price: $59.50 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Jens C. Dammann
Eric Stein's Thoughts from a Bridge is a collection of writings on
European law and politics dating from 1971 to 1997. Their main (but not
exclusive) focus is on the legal and political process of European integration.
Part I, entitled "Constitutionalizing, Harmonizing," deals with the
emergence of European Community law as a new and independent legal
order. In "Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution,"
the author observes that the European Community Treaty has gradually-by
means of interpretation-been attributed qualities that are generally regarded
as characteristic of a constitution rather than an international treaty. The
author then examines how the European Court of Justice, the Advocates
General before the Court, the European Commission (the main administrative
organ of the European Community), and the governments of member states
have contributed to this development. Analyzing a variety of legal
proceedings before the European Court of Justice, he demonstrates that while
the governments of the member states tend to oppose the
"constitutionalization" of the European Community Treaty, the other actors
mentioned above are largely united in their efforts to promote this
development. Another essay, "The Making of the First Coordination
Directive: A Case Study," concentrates on the process of harmonizing
statutory law within the member states of the European Community. Tracing
the legislative history of the first directive in the field of company law, the
essay depicts the difficulties of reaching a political consensus in view of
differing legal traditions as well as differing interests.
Part II of the book, "European Integration and the American Federal
Experience," compares the European path to integration with the American
concept of federalism. To this end, the author starts with an essay on "Uses,
Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law." He first explores in general
terms the conditions that have to be met in order for a legal norm to be
successfully "transplanted" from one system into another. Based on a
comparison between the United States and Europe, the author proceeds to
argue that the United States should attribute a greater role to the method of
comparative law in lawmaking, legal research, and legal education. In a
reprinted excerpt from Courts and Free Markets-Perspectives from the
United States and Europe, the author compares the role of courts in the United
States with that in Europe with regard to courts' role in dividing governmental
power between central and local governments. Another essay, "Towards a
European Foreign Policy? The European Foreign Affairs System from the
Perspective of the United States Constitution," compares and analyzes the
institutional arrangements for the conduct of foreign affairs in the United
States and in the European Community. From this starting point, the author
develops several requirements that Europe has to meet in order to develop a
common foreign policy, such as an adherence to the principle of majority
voting in the Community Council, a more assertive role of the Commission in
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foreign affairs, and a strengthening of the voice of the European Parliament.
In his Panel Statement on "Democracy without 'a People,"' the author
addresses the question of the so-called "democratic deficit" in the European
Union and especially within its most important pillar, the European
Community. (The arrangements set out in the European Community Treaty,
the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty, and the European Coal and
Steel Community Treaty form the "community dimension" of the European
Union, which is complemented by the common foreign and security policy
under Title V of the European Union Treaty, and by the police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters under Title VI of the European Union Treaty).
It is widely agreed that the accountability of both the European
Commission and the Council is not altogether satisfactory. Both organs derive
their democratic legitimacy mostly from the governments of the member
states. While in principle the governments of the member states are
accountable to the national parliaments, the national governments' policy with
regard to Europe falls into the domain of foreign affairs, in which the control
exerted by national parliaments is traditionally limited. The question of how to
address this lack of democratic accountability is highly controversial, with
proposals ranging from an enhancement of the role of national parliaments in
the field of European policy to the transformation of the European Union into
a federal state. The author argues in favor of a middle road: While considering
measures on the level of the member states to be insufficient, he rejects the
transformation of the European Community into a federal state and instead
suggests incremental reforms on the European level, such as a gradual
strengthening of the role of the European Parliament.
In Part III, "Europe's Burden of History," the author leaves the realm of
European integration and focuses instead on problems specific to particular
European countries. The essay "History Against Free Speech: German Law in
European and American Perspective" deals with the struggle of postwar
Germany to find a balance between the protection of free speech and the
protection of individuals from anti-Semitic hate speech. In particular, the
author focuses on the controversy surrounding the introduction in 1985 of a
law designed to modify the German Criminal Code. This law eliminated the
private petition requirement for the prosecution of insult, if (among other
things) the insulted party is a member of a group that was persecuted "under
the National Socialist or another violent and arbitrary dominance" (p. 373).
While some members of the legislature thought that the existing provisions of
the criminal code provided sufficient protection against hate speech, others
criticized the fact that the law seemed to consider the Holocaust and instances
of violent and arbitrary dominance as being comparable. The author concludes
that there may no longer be a national consensus in Germany as to whether the
Holocaust has to be regarded as a singular crime without any parallel in
history. Part III of the book also contains excerpts from Czecho/Slovakia:
Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup, in which the
author provides a detailed analysis of the break-up of the former
Czechoslovakia into two independent countries. In so doing, the author
addresses a variety of underlying questions, such as: What is the source of
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ethnic conflicts? What are the prospects for democratic multiethnic policies in
an ethnically divided grouping? What institutional form offers the most
promise to contain a specific ethnic conflict? It would, of course, be too much
to expect (and the author does not claim) to give definite and final answers to
questions of such fundamental importance and scope in one essay. However,
he convincingly points out some of the elements most likely to play an
important role answering these questions, for example, by stressing the
negative effects of ignorance about an ethnic minority's culture on the part of
the majority of the population.
Thoughts from a Bridge is a remarkable book in that most of the
fundamental issues raised in the different essays have lost none of their
importance in the time since the essays were written. For example, the
harmonization of statutes in the member states of the European Community is
no simpler today than it was in the 1980s. While easily accessible to the
reader, Thoughts from a Bridge offers valuable insight into the complexity of
the legal and political issues that have to be faced on the road to European
integration.
Empire. By Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 2000. Price: $35.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Shelby
S. Guilbert, Jr.
Empire begins with the premise that globalization is effectively
transforming such basic traditional political concepts as sovereignty, the
nation, and the people. These concepts are being replaced by a new concept of
universal "Empire." This Empire does not represent a return to earlier forms
of European imperialism, and is not a metaphor that is meant to compare the
current international order to previous forms of empire. Rather, the authors'
new concept of Empire is one that knows no spatial boundaries. Their Empire,
like previous Marxist constructs, seeks not only to regulate human
interactions, but also to rule directly over human nature as "the object of its
rule is social life in its entirety.... Finally, although the practice of Empire is
continually bathed in blood, the concept of Empire is always dedicated to
peace-a perpetual and universal peace outside of history" (p. xv).
Hardt and Negri locate much of the impetus for the shift to Empire in the
ongoing shift to postmodern cultural and economic conditions. The authors
highlight new forms of identity, economic organization, and networks of
communication and control which have emerged in the postmodern era, and
they attempt to demonstrate that these new forms are undermining the notions
of the nation and sovereignty that are central to the current international order.
According to the authors, these changes are currently most noticeable in the
United States, but the new Empire which is emerging is not centered in
America. Empire, according to Hardt and Negri, is not a spatial entity but a
single power that bases its authority on a new imperial notion of right.
While the new Empire may not have a political or juridical center in the
United States, Hardt and Negri do contend that their concept of Empire is
loosely founded on certain American principles of constitutionalism. The
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authors argue that the American Revolution represents a break with the
traditional concept of sovereignty, which had developed primarily in Europe,
and represents the emergence of a prehistory of post-national imperial
sovereignty. This new sovereignty arises from the Founders' "constitutional
formation of limits and equilibria, checks and balances, which both constitutes
a central power and maintains power in the hands of the multitude" (p. 161).
This type of sovereignty is precursor to the imperial sovereignty of today that
the authors believe is based on networks of power.
Hardt and Negri describe the development of imperial sovereignty
though a discussion of four phases of American constitutional history. The
authors believe that each phase of U.S. constitutional history "marks a step
toward the realization of imperial sovereignty" (p. 168). All four phases
demonstrate that the U.S. constitutional project is distinct from imperialist
projects of the past, which had constantly sought to invade, conquer, and
subsume other countries within the imperialist's sovereignty. America's
constitutional history is instead filled not only with periods of territorial
expansion, but also internal reform, and "is constructed on the model of
rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular
relations in networks across and unbounded terrain." (p. 182). The authors'
Empire consists of "the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional
project" (p. 182). Hardt and Negri hope that within the matrix of their
stipulated ongoing imperial project the proletarian multitude will emerge as a
political force. They conclude that their new form of Empire creates a unique
potential for revolution that was previously impossible in modem states, and
they hope that the masses will successfully usher in a new constitution of the
multitude that is more egalitarian and democratic than currently existing
political systems.
While Hardt and Negri offer a powerful description of the way the world
is (and could be) organized, they overly discount the current importance of
independent nations. While national identities may be irrational, they do still
exist and have not yet been completely overcome by globalization. The
authors state that in order to control the multitude, Empire must assert
command over the multitude's productive power, thereby increasingly
corrupting, and over time destroying, the very processes which create the
wealth on which the imperial project depends. Out of this inevitable
corruption of Empire, the authors think a constitution of the multitude can
emerge to protect the authors' postulated rights of global citizenship-a social
wage, and a re-appropriation of wealth. However, if national identities remain
an impediment to notions of imperial right, it is unlikely that this Marxist
utopia is possible, especially given communism's historic inability to address
the "national question." Moreover, the authors assume that states are declining
vis-A-vis transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations
without first proving this premise. The authors need to more forcefully
demonstrate how globalization is transforming a world dominated by states




Hardt and Negri's book, Empire, is groundbreaking in that it transcends
established Marxist doctrine and provides a new communist manifesto for the
twenty first century. Concomitantly, their work represents a return to earlier
Marxist notions of progress and a move away from the modem Left's focus
on protecting workers from the forces of globalization. Nevertheless, Hardt
and Negri do not successfully demonstrate how their communist utopian
vision can be achieved or formed out of the processes currently at work in
today's Empire.
International Trade
The United States, the European Union, and the "Globalization" of World
Trade-Allies or Adversaries? By Thomas C. Fischer. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000. Pp. ix, 342. Price: $79.95
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Larysa M. Gumowskyj.
The emerging world economic order manifests the evolving process of
global interdependence. Recognizing there can no longer be national
economic policies impervious to global pressure, Thomas Fischer develops a
comprehensive overview of the "globalization" of world trade. Fischer
outlines the debate over the existence of a global trading system and how it
should be structured. His realistic, yet guardedly optimistic, comparative
approach provides a useful introduction and a solid foundation for study in the
field of international economic policy.
The first half of the book acquaints the reader with the terms and
phenomena that comprise the "globalization" process. Fischer defines
"globalization" as "a substantial melding of interests across national borders
so that 'global' solutions are important but national perspectives are not" and
involving "the significant shift from public interests and actors to private
interests and actors" (p. 4). The author relies on the questionable assumption
that the United States has lost its hegemonic position when he argues there is a
need for a world trade system that is "neither totally free and capitalistic nor
too heavily regulated" (p. 8). He outlines four distinct economic models that
he expects to compete for implementation as the global paradigm-free-
market capitalism, macro-managed capitalism, micro-managed capitalism,
and communism. In presenting the principle issues confronting the global
trade community, he discusses market access, balanced trade, monetary
stability, foreign direct investment, intellectual property protection, and
international crime and terrorism, among other issues.
Fischer spends most of the second half of the book tracing the major
state actors, institutions and phenomena that facilitated the emergence of the
three dominant and competing trading blocs-the United States, Europe and
the Pacific Rim/Asia. He examines the future of the North American Free
Trade Agreement and the Free Trade Area of the Americas and he places
importance on cross-border alliances. The author's focus, however, is
primarily on the European Union, its formation, evolution and potential.
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Chapters eight, nine and ten offer a comprehensive discussion of the problems
of federalization inherent in the integration and future deepening and
widening of the European Community. Fischer recognizes Europe as
America's most obvious ally but is quick to highlight the problems that the
EU needs to confront in order to overcome its status as a "poor third to Japan
and the U.S. in the field of global trade" (p. 135). Overall however, he is
optimistic and even foresees the possibility of Europe's next generation
surpassing expectations through their "imagination and energy" (p. 135).
In his treatment of Japan, China and "Asia's emerging economies," (p.
178) including Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand,
Fischer is both less optimistic and less thorough. He calls for a drastic
escalation in East Asian stability and competitiveness, predicting, "the world
economy will not fully stabilize until emerging Asian economies do" (p. 197).
China, the author asserts, must commit to reform and to a less-regulated
economy, as its mistakes in centralized economic management have
negatively impacted the entire world. However, Fischer admits "China has
been a very solid player during the Asian crisis and could eventually replace
Japan as the economic lynchpin of the region" (p. 177). Japan, on the other
hand, needs a radical "jump start" (p. 159) and Fischer doubts it will remain
the dominant economy in the region. There will be no recovery in Japan
unless there is substantial structural reform, and Fischer believes "it is naive to
think that Japan will adopt a radical recovery plan any time soon" (p. 159).
Fischer also focuses one chapter near the end of the book on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and their role in international trade. He outlines the structure of the
WTO and examines the procedures involved in the dispute settlement process,
ultimately concluding, "[flew international organizations have as much
potential to harmonize world trade as the WTO" (p. 219). However, he
recognizes there are a number of crucial issues that could challenge its future
success, including the questions of leadership succession, institutional reform,
and expanding membership.
In the final chapter, Fischer brings together premises and elements from
the book's earlier parts, presents a final analysis of the new era of world trade,
and states a number of conclusions. Regarding his economic models, the
author theorizes that "some type of managed capitalism is likely to emerge-
capitalistic enough to encourage and reward enterprise and innovation, yet
socialistic enough to cushion capitalism's extreme consequences" (p. 224).
Fischer's premise, that the United States' leadership in world trade is waning,
requires the United States to form alliances, which for the author should start
with the European Union. These two trading blocs will continue to compete,
but the convergence of their economies and the world economy will
progressively connect them to a single fate. Trade harmonization is inevitable
and the international trading system calls for flexibility, concentrated finance,
and leadership-including a WTO with legitimacy.
Fischer states his straightforward thesis as follows: "Trade globalization
is a powerful and complicated force in today's world, beyond the ability of
any single nation to control" (p. 223). He admits "the subject is as vast,
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complex and intertwined as any," so he breaks it up and presents it in
comprehensive sections, "even at the expense of some oversimplification" (p.
xi). The reader is left with a thorough overview (as opposed to a deeper but
more limited theoretical analysis) of the economic, institutional, social,
environmental, political and legal challenges faced by the emerging global
economic order. Fischer's book presents the basics in a pragmatic and
comparative manner, acting as a primer for the student of trade globalization
while serving to stimulate new reflections by scholars of the subject.
The Jurisprudence of GAT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and
Economic Relations. By John H. Jackson. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii, 497. Price; $69.95 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Craig Forcese.
Nineteenth-century British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli once
observed, "Free trade is not a principle, it is an expedient." In his new book,
John H. Jackson traces the path of global free trade in the post-war era: from
principle to expedient and back, perhaps, towards principle.
A compilation of articles published elsewhere during the prolific career
of this international trade lawyer. The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO
serves two purposes. First, the book describes the fortunes of world trade law
from the introduction in 1947 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) as a temporary remedial measure, through the GATT's evolution as
the chief arbiter of world trade during the bumpy era of managed trade and,
finally, to the development of the more permanent World Trade Organization
(WTO). Second, the book traces the development of Jackson's scholarship,
incorporating both detailed legal analyses of specific attributes of the GATT
and the WTO and some of Jackson's more speculative thinking on the
prospects for "rule oriented" international trade law.
Concentrating initially on the GATT's peculiar provenance, its "birth
defects," and its institutional basis, the first set of articles discusses the
motivations for an agreement unlikely in its early years to "have qualified as
'most likely to succeed' among international organizations" (p. 18). These
chapters detail the legal mechanics of the GATT as an international treaty,
touching on the vision of mutual prosperity and security via liberalized trade
that drove the Bretton Woods process. Progressing to the Tokyo Round and
the early 1980s, the articles flag the increasig prominence of non-tariff
barriers as an impediment to trade-one ill-regulated by the original GATT-
and point to the challenges to the integrity of the GATT posed by piecemeal
side agreements. In this last respect, the articles highlight the ambiguity of the
Tokyo Round defense of GATT "Most Favored Nation" principles, the resort
to "managed" over free trade, and the failure to deal with some of the GATT's
institutional shortcomings.
The subsequent section shifts the book's focus to several key principles
and expediencies of international trade law. First among these is the concept
of "Most-Favored Nation" (MFN). Noting the emergence of MFN in pre-
GATT international practice, Jackson analyzes the concept's importance in
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the GATT, focusing on economic and political justifications for GATT Article
One's MFN pledge and then discussing the exceptions to MFN scattered
through the GATT Agreement. In the next chapter, Jackson discusses export-
restraint agreements, examining their legal propriety under the GATT. The
subsequent article concentrates on subsidies and countervailing duties,
highlighting the economic, political and legal context of such measures in the
GATT era. The final piece in this section discusses the challenge of regional
trade blocs in the late GATT period, considers the consistency of these zones
with the GATT, and touches on the implications of regional blocs for the
world trade system.
The next collection of chapters discusses the dispute settlement
procedures of the GATT and the WTO. Noting the institutional weakness of
dispute resolution under the GATT, the first article analyzes in depth the legal
significance of GATT panel reports, a question Jackson asks again in a
subsequent chapter with reference to WTO dispute settlement reports. Also in
this section, Jackson considers the issue of the standard of review under the
WTO, contemplating the extent to which WTO dispute settlement bodies
should defer to national government determinations. The final piece in the
section highlights some of the emerging problems with the WTO's dispute
process. Specific concerns include the relative balance of power between the
Organization and its members, and the WTO's institutional ability to grapple
with the emerging challenges of "globalization."
Collected under the heading "GATT, international treaties, and national
laws and constitutions," the next six articles consider the significance for U.S.
domestic law of the GATT and now the WTO. Providing a comprehensive
evaluation of the GATT's domestic law status, the first chapter constitutes an
important resource on the incorporation of international treaty law into the
fabric of U.S. law. Indeed, later selections in this section take up this issue at
great length, evaluating the United States' partly dualist tradition and touching
only incidentally on trade-law treaties. Other articles build on the treaty
incorporation discussion, focusing first on the impact of U.S. and European
Economic Community (EEC) internal legal constraints on domestic responses
to international trade obligations and then on the merits of the highly legalistic
U.S. approach to international economic relations. The final chapter is a more
reflective inquiry into the contested approval of the WTO by Congress,
approached from the perspective of "sovereignty."
The book's final section, "The Uruguay Round and beyond:
perspectives and conclusions," is Jackson at his most contemplative.
Providing a brief overview of the WTO, Jackson considers how the new body
will grapple with emerging issues, particularly the environment. Many of
these last selections pose questions, introduce hypotheticals and propose
visions of where the WTO must go from here. These articles are directed at
how rule-based international economic relations can be bolstered in fashions
consistent with the new challenges of globalization.
In some respects, Jurisprudence is a grab-bag-a disparate,
sometimes repetitive, collection of writings ranging from detailed technical
analyses of measures now largely of historical importance to think-pieces of
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real contemporary significance. What emerges from the book, however, are
the honest, optimistic reflections of an international lawyer as he considers the
haphazard emergence of economic globalization. The vision projected is of a
global economic order built with high hopes and strong principles, but poor
architecture in the immediate post-war era, subsequently ill-served by its
institutional inadequacies in the 1970s and 1980s-when principle gave way
to tampering with trade-and now poised to move into a new era of rule-
centricity. The cautionary lesson drawn from the book is that even with the
codification of the new WTO, efforts must be made to accommodate and
reconcile the vision of free trade with the problems sparked by its very
success, lest Disraeli's maxim prove correct once more.

